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city." In this way more capable and qualified men could be selected-
men who are able to grasp fully the importance and responsibility of
the office.
MENTAL INCOMPETENCE IN INDIANA: STANDARDS AND
TYPES OF EVIDENCE
The Indiana statutes make it clear that mentally ill and incapacitated
persons are to be treated differently from other persons in regard to cer-
tain attempted legal acts, and the legal consequences which flow from a
finding of mental incompetence are fairly uniform.1 There is, however,
some confusion as to the standards which must be met in each of the
transactions in order to prove an allegation of mental incompetence, and
there is even more confusion as to the types of evidence which must be
produced if the applicable standard is to be satisfied. The purpose of
this inquiry is to examine these latter questions in four major areas of
private law-contracts, wills, gifts, and guardianship. The statutes rele-
vant to these areas, except the ones relating to guardianship, operate di-
rectly or indirectly upon the purported legal act of a person "of unsound
mind."2  The guardianship provisions are operative upon an "incompe-
tent."'  Both of these terms have statutory definitions.4  The words of
93. "Popular election, wrapped as it is in the American flag, is a very difficult
institution to root out even though virtually every student of the problem concludes
that the basic reform necessary is the elimination of politics from the office. But the
query naturally arises: how would appointment eliminate 'politics'? The answer is
best demonstrated by experience. United States attorneys on the whole enjoy a greater
prestige, and their records are demonstrably more efficient than those of the elected
state prosecutors." Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv.
40, 57-58 (1949). Pound wisely adds: "If it is imperative to divorce prosecution from
politics, it is no less imperative to divorce the bench from politics." PoUND, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 192.
1. Mental incompetence is defined as "that type or degree of mental disorder, in
any particular case, which is legally significant and which produces a different legal
result than would have followed from the same situation had not the particular type or
degree of mental disorder been -present." Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of
Mental Incompetency, 39 Micar. L. REv. 1189, 1191-92 (1940).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-102 (Burns 1951) (alienation of lands) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 8-141 (Burns 1946) (contracts, sales and conveyances generally) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §
58-102 (Burns 1951) (purchase of necessaries) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-501 (Burns 1953)
(testamentary disposition).
3. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-106 (Burns 1953).
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4701 (Bums 1946) (general provisions relating to civil
procedure). "[Third] The phrase 'of unsound mind' includes idiots, noncompotes [non
compos mentis], lunatics and distracted persons."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-101 (Burns 1953). "Definitions and use of terms: . . . (c) An
'incompetent' is any person who is (1) Under the age of majority, (2) Incapable by
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definition, however, are largely descriptive and of no aid to a court in
attempting to derive a legal standard upon which to decide individual
cases. Thus, the question of legal standards of mental competence and
the relation of evidence to them must be approached through an analysis
of the case law.
STANDARDS
Contracts. The term contract as here used is restricted to a transac-
tion between two or more persons involving a bargained-for considera-
tion. Conveyances based upon bargained-for consideration are included,
although there is some authority to the effect that conveyances, whether
executed in furtherance of contractual or donative purposes, are subject
to a special standard as to the competence of the parties.5 This distinc-
tion is illogical, however, and is not drawn in the better-considered
opinions.'
The question of whether a party was mentally incompetent to exe-
cute a contract arises in four situations. First, the party seeking to avoid
the purported contract may have been under active guardianship at the
time it was executed. Second, he may never have previously been ad-
judged incompetent in any legal proceeding. Third, he may have been
adjudged insane for purposes of commitment to a mental institution.
Fourth, he may have previously been adjudged incompetent for purposes
of relief from some former obligation. In the first situation, the pur-
ported contract is void; no inquiry into the mental capacity of the party
is permitted." The second requires an actual determination of the per-
son's competence at the time of the act. The last two require the same
determination, although they apparently raise a presumption in favor of
incompetence.' Thus, a legal standard of competence to contract is the
crucial factor in each of the last three situations.
This standard has received numerous formulations in the Indiana
courts. Disregarding variations and refinements in word usage one may
identify three stages of development. The early cases simply required a
reason of insanity, mental illness, imbecility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkeness, excessive
use of drugs, old age, infirmity, or other incapacity, of either managing his property
or caring for himself or both."
5. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950) ; Keplinger v.
Ward, 116 Ind. App. 517, 65 N.E.2d 644 (1946) ; Deckard v. Kleindorfer, 108 Ind. App.
485, 29 N.E.2d 997 (1940).
6. See Mahin v. Soshnick, 148 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 1958); Daugherty v.
Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944). See also Somers v. Pumphrey,
24 Ind. 231 (1865).
7. Redden v. Baker, 86 Ind. 191 (1882); Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42 (1876).
8. See Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30 (1862). Cf. Emry v. Beaver, 192 Ind. 471,
137 N.E. 55 (1922) ; Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Ind. 161, 30 N.E. 1069 (1891).
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finding that the alleged incompetent lacked the mental capacity to under-
stand and act with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life-an objective
standard.9 Later, the courts began to inquire into the person's ability to
act with discretion in regard to the contract involved in the litigation, as
well as his ability to act with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life.
This subjective approach required a consideration of what the person
knew or, ultimately, had the ability to know about the provisions of the
agreement itself. Thus, what might be termed a transitional stage ap-
peared incorporating both subjective and objective elements into the con-
tract standard. The elements of the standard were stated as mental capa-
city to comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature and probable
consequences, and to act with discretion in relation thereto or with rela-
tion to the ordinary affairs of life.'" The third stage, represented by the
recent cases," omits all reference to the ordinary affairs element and
completes the transition from an objective standard to a subjective one.
These latter cases, however, are not completely in accord as to the proper
formulation of the standard. One group adopts the transitional stage
statement without the ordinary affairs element. 2 Another speaks of the
ability of the actor "to understand, in a reasonable manner, the nature
and effect of the act in which he is engaged; and in order to avoid a con-
tract it must appear not only that the person was of unsound mind or in-
sane when it was made, but that the unsoundness or insanity was of such
a character that he had no reasonable perception or understanding of the
nature or terms of the contract." 3 In legal effect there is probably no
difference between these statements; but for clarity the first seems
preferable.
Wills. Every will contest based upon an allegation that the testator
was of unsound mind at the time he executed the instrument requires a
factual finding of mental incompetence. Although no Indiana cases are
9. The statement usually found is that the alleged incompetent must show an
essential privation of the reasoning faculties, or incapacity of understanding and acting
with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life. The "essential privation of reasoning"
component is mererly alternative phraseology and is sometimes omitted. Brannon v.
Hayes, 190 Ind. 420, 130 N.E. 803 (1920) ; Raymond v. Watham, 142 Ind. 367, 41 N.E.
815 (1895); Wray v. Wray, 32 Ind. 126 (1869); Darnell v. Rowland, 30 Ind. 342
(1868) ; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231 (1865).
10. Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 1047 (1895).
11. Mahin v. Soshnick, 148 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 1958); Buuck v. Kruckeberg,
121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950); Keplinger v. Ward, 116 Ind. App. 517, 65
N.E.2d 644 (1946) ; Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944);
Deckard v. Kleindorfer, 108 Ind. App. 485, 29 N.E.2d 997 (1940).
12. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, supra note 11; Keplinger v. Ward, supra note 11;
Deckard v. Kleindorfer, supra note 11.
13. Mahin v. Soshnick, 148 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. App. 1958). See also Daugherty
v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944).
NOTES
directly in point, there is language in an early case to the effect that an
adjudication of mental incompetence for purposes of appointment of a
guardian merely creates "prima facie evidence" of incompetence to ex-
ecute a will.14 Prior adjudications of incompetence or insanity for other
purposes would seem to do no more, if as much.15 Thus, in every such
case a legal standard of mental competence must guide the direction of
trial and ultimately determine the issue.
The standard of testamentary capacity, unlike that of contractual
capacity, has from its inception been adapted to the peculiar nature of the
transaction involved. The earliest authoritative cases16 recite the follow-
ing elements: that the testator have sufficient mental capacity to know
and understand the business in which he is engaged, the extent of his
estate, and the persons who would naturally be the objects of his bounty;
that he be able to keep these things in his mind long enough to form a
rational judgment in relation thereto; and that he be able to form a
rational judgment in relation to the will. A subsequent and equally
authoritative line of cases"r modified this statement of the standard by
eliminating the requirement of ability to know and understand the busi-
ness in which the testator is engaged, and adding the requirement that the
testator not only be capable of knowing the persons who are the natural
objects of his bounty, but also their deserts with reference to their treat-
ment of him and their "capacity and necessity." These alterations are
more than mere refinement of language. The requirement of knowing
14. Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Ind. 161, 30 N.E. 1069 (1891). See also Emry v.
Beaver, 192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922) (discharge of guardian not conclusive of
ability to execute will on same day).
15. As to the value of prior commitment to an institution as evidence of mental
incompetence to contract, see Mahin v. Soshnick, 148 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 1958).
16. Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 40 N.E. 70 (1895) ; Harrison v. Bishop, supra
note 14; Lowder v. Lowder, 58 Ind. 538 (1877); Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (1871).
See also Cline v. Lindsay, 110 Ind. 337, 11 N.E. 441 (1886).
17. Wiley v. Gordon, 181 Ind. 252, 104 N.E. 500 (1913); Crawfordsville Trust
Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N.E. 177 (1912) ; Hoffbaur v. Morgan, 172 Ind. 273,
88 N.E. 337 (1909) ; Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 1047 (1895) ; Burkhart
v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N.E. 118 (1889). McReynolds v. Smith, 172 Ind. 336, 86
N.E. 1009 (1909), and Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913), adopt
this standard with a slight variation. Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417
(1917), adds certain qualifying language. Blough v. Parry, supra note 16, accepts this
statement of the rule as well as the previous one. See note 16 supra. Ditton v. Hart,
175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 96 (1911), recites as elements of the standard that the testator
have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the business in which he is
engaged, to recollect the property he means to dispose of and the persons who are the
natural objects of his bounty, and to understand the manner in which it is to be distributed
among them. This language was taken from Harrison v. Rowan, 11 Fed. Cas. 659 (No.
6141) (C.C.D.N.J. 1820). It was not subsequently followed by the Indiana courts.
For another variation which is probably not significant see Whiteman v. Whiteman, 152
Ind. 263, 53 N.E. 225 (1899).
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and understanding that one is making a will probably should not be left
to implication as would be the situation under the second line of cases.
Further, it is arguable that the addition of the "capacity and necessity"
element makes the standard stricter than the earlier cases indicated it
should be. If "capacity" refers to earning power and "necessity" refers
to the purchasing power needed to keep a particular individual or family
reasonably happy, the ability to know these things could require con-
siderable mentality. It may have been these considerations which led
Justice McMahan of the appellate court to adopt a trial court instruction
in 1927, which combined the important elements of both standards in
refined and precise language. He wrote:
These instructions follow the law as announced many times by
the Supreme Court. They are good ones to follow and for that
reason we set them out in full: Instruction 8 . . If he has
sufficient mind to enable him to know and understand the ex-
tent and value of his property, the number and names of those
who are the natural objects of his bounty, their situations and
conditions, and their deserts with reference to their conduct to-
wards him and their treatment of him, and he is able to keep
these things in his mind long enough to form a rational judg-
ment in relation to them, and to have his will prepared and ex-
ecuted and to understand the nature of the business in which he
is engaged, he is capable of making a valid will."
This statement of the standard of testamentary capacity has been beyond
impeachment. Neither the supreme nor appellate court has since seen fit
to modify it or even to rule on the question.
The elements of the standard have undergone considerable refinement
as to meaning, so that today there is little chance of misapprehension.
The requirement of mind and memory to know the extent and value of
one's estate does not mean an ability to know these exactly," nor does
the requirement imply that the testator need actually know them.2" Pre-
cisely what is meant by "natural objects of his bounty" has not been
defined, but it has been held that erroneous views as to the law of de-
scent constitute slight ground, if any, for an inference of mental in-
competence." For the sake of logic and simplicity it would seem that
18. Jewett v. Farlow, 88 Ind. App. 301, 306, 157 N.E. 458, 460 (1927).
19. Friedersdorf v. Lacy, 173 Ind. 429, 90 N.E. 766 (1910).
20. McReynolds v. Smith, 172 Ind. 336, 86 N.E. 1009 (1909).
21. Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961 (1911) ; Barricklow v. Stewart,
163 Ind. 438, 72 N.E. 128 (1904). In Jewett v. Farlow, 88 Ind. App. 301, 157 N.E. 458
(1927), the court sets out an instruction which states that the question as to who were
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the testator should be required to have the ability to know who would
take his property if he died intestate.2 This position is not inconsistent
with the holding just mentioned since erroneous views of technical rules
of law have little relation to the ability to understand them if one has
been properly informed. The requirement that the testator be able to
retain the elements in his mind long enough to form a rational judgment
in relation to them is an essential one, but failure of the trial court or
jury to make a specific finding on the point is not reversible error if such
a finding can be inferred from other findings.22 Capacity to understand
the nature of the business in which the testator is engaged and, by impli-
cation, the nature and effect of the will does not connote an ability to
understand the provisions in their legal form.24 Finally, if one is of
sound mind when the will is prepared, but suffers a serious illness before
he is able to sign it, he must have mental ability at the latter time to know
more than that he is signing a will which he has already prepared.2"
Gifts. Inter vivos gifts of personalty and conveyances of land with-
out bargained-for consideration may be grouped together in so far as the
applicability of a standard of mental competence to enter into such trans-
actions is concerned. The Indiana courts have equated them in this re-
gard.2" They have not, however, seen fit to devise a specific standard to
apply to the situation. Instead, the question has been approached as one
of choosing between the contract standard and the will standard. The
courts' preference is clear from the following passage:
If inducements or influences from the donee, to make the gift,
should be considered in determining the test of mental capacity,
we are unable to discern why the same inducements and influ-
ences might not obtain in the execution of a will as of a gift.
Either is like the other, in that the donor receives no recom-
pense or equivalent for that which he gives. . . . It is our judg-
ment that the capacity to execute a will is the perfect requisite
the natural objects of the testator's bounty was one of fact to be determined by the
jury from the evidence, but it does not expressly approve or disapprove this portion of
the instruction. The question of what is meant by the natural objects of one's bounty
would seem to be of some significance since the fact that the testator did or did not
leave his property to the natural objects of his bounty might give rise to inferences
as to whether he was capable of knowing who they were.
22. See Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 At. 890 (1928).
23. Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107 N.E. 675 (1915).
24. Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961 (1911).
25. Terry v. Davenport, 170 Ind. 74, 83 N.E. 636 (1907).
26. Thorne v. Cosand, 160 Ind. 566, 67 N.E. 257 (1902).
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for the execution of a gift inter vivos2
However, two recent cases which consider the problem of mental capa-
city to execute a gift have drawn into doubt not only the holding quoted,
but also the entire system of classification of standards previously recog-
nized.2" Both cases involved gifts of land. In discussing contentions of
mental incompetence, the appellate court recited a standard resembling
that of contracts but called it a "test of capacity to make a deed." Not
only were the previously separate concepts of competence to contract and
competence to execute a gift disregarded, but in one of the cases the court
went on to say: "No greater degree of mental capacity is required in such
a case than is required to make a will." 9 Acceptance of these cases may
lead to the somewhat illogical position that the standard of mental com-
petence in a transaction involving a gift of personalty is the same as the
will standard, but that the contract standard is used in a transaction in-
volving a gift of land. More probably, these cases represent a recognition
that the will standard is not a very useful device when cast in the con-
text of an inter vivos gift.
Guardianship. Prior to the adoption of the Indiana Probate Code,"0
the statutes controlling guardianship provided that a proceeding could be
instituted against any person alleged to be "of unsound mind and incap-
able of managing his own estate."'" This followed generally the language
of the other statutes affecting the legal status of incompetent persons. 2
A proceeding could also be brought against a person alleged to be incap-
able of managing his estate or business affairs because of old age, in-
firmity, improvidence, or prodigality.2 The Probate Code does away
with the confusing detailed provisions of the former law, stating simply
27. Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 100, 40 N.E. 1047, 1048 (1895) (gift of
personalty). See also Thorne v. Cosand, supra note 26 (conveyance for love and
affection).
28. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950) ; Deckard v.
Kleindorfer, 108 Ind. App. 485, 29 N.E.2d 997 (1940). See also Keplinger v. Ward,
116 Ind. App. 517, 65 N.E.2d 644 (1946).
29. Deckard v. Kleindorfer, .mtpra note 28 at 491, 29 N.E.2d at 999.
30. Ind. Acts 1953, ch. 112; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-101-8-218 (Burns 1953).
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-202 (Bums 1933).
32. See notes 2-4 supra.
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-301 (Burns 1933). Although § 8-301 referred primarily
to the clerk and prosecutor, the cases under the prior law made it clear that if the
complaint alleged only that the person proceeded against was incapable of managing
his own estate because of old age or infirmity, it was not necessary to prove any mental
impairment to justify appointment of a guardian. In Silver v. Newcomer, 80 Ind. App.
406, 140 N.E. 455 (1923), appointment of a guardian was sustained solely upon evidence
of the person's physical incapacity. See also Perry v. Perry, 108 Ind. App. 93, 27
N.E.2d 133 (1940) ; Harvey v. Rodger, 84 Ind. App. 409, 143 N.E. 8 (1924).
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that guardians may be appointed for "minors and other incompetents."34
The definition of "incompetent"3 is more comprehensive than was that
of "unsound mind"3 6 in the former law and is framed so as to point out
clearly the ultimate issue, namely, whether the person is incapable of
managing his property, caring for himself, or both. The definition also
incorporates the words which under the former law were construed to
apply to persons whose only disability was physical." Therefore, such
persons would seem to fall within the purview of the present statute. The
primary problem here, however, is to determine the standard of compe-
tence to be applied to mentally incapacitated persons.
Under the former law38 the test of incompetence most widely cited,
whether for appointment of a guardian or for discharge because of res-
toration of the ward," was that the person must be incapable of conduct-
ing the ordinary affairs of life, and in a condition to become the victim
of his own folly or the fraud of others.4" A widely recited variation
required simply that the person be incapable of understanding and acting
with discretion or with reasonable prudence in the ordinary affairs of
life.4 Occasionally the courts have merely used the words of the statute,
i.e., capability of managing one's own estate.42 Sometimes they have
added the ordinary affairs or ordinary "business" affairs test.43
The apparent conflict in these statements is lessened when one recog-
nizes, as has the Indiana Supreme Court, that the capacity to understand
and act with discretion in ordinary business affairs necessarily implies
the capacity to manage one's own estate and that in most cases the ordi-
nary affairs of a person's life will include the management of his estate.44
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-118 (Burns 1953).
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-101 (Burns 1953). See note 4 supra.
36. Ibid.
37. See note 4 supra.
38. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 8-202, 8-204, 8-301 (Burns 1933). There are no significant
adjudications under the Indiana Probate Code of 1953.
39. Shafer v. Shafer, 181 Ind. 244, 104 N.E. 507 (1913), and Cochran v. Amsden,
104 Ind. 282, 3 N.E. 934 (1885)-, indicate that the same test is- applicable in both situations.
Guardianship based upon incompetence other than minority may not be discharged until
there has been judicial inquiry into the ward's capacity to manage his own estate. An
entry on court records by the judge finding one previously adjudged mentally incompetent
to be restored to sanity on the basis of a state hospital certificate does not amount to a
finding of competence sufficient to justify discharge of the guardian. State ex rel
Codding v. Eby, 223 Ind. 302, 60 N.E.2d 527 (1945).
40. McCammon v. Cunningham, 108 Ind. 545, 9 N.E. 455 (1886).
41. Shafer v. Shafer, 181 Ind. 244, 104 N.E. 507 (1913) (discretion); Fiscus v.
Turner, 125 Ind. 46, 24 N.E. 662 (1890) (discretion) ; Hamrick v. State ex rel Hamrick,
134 Ind. 324, 34 N.E. 3 (1893) (reasonable prudence).
42. Cochran v. Amsden, 104 Ind. 282, 283, 3 N.E. 934, 935 (1885).
43. Perry v. Perry, 108 Ind. App. 93, 27 N.E.2d 133 (1940) ; Silver v. Newcomer,
80 Ind. App. 406, 140 N.E. 455 (1923).
44. Cochran v. Amsden, 104 Ind. 282, 285, 3 N.E. 934, 935 (1885).
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It may also be pointed out that the ordinary business affairs test is neces-
sarily very close to the test for capacity to execute a particular contract
since managing one's own estate implies the legal ability to contract. The
only difference is that in the latter instance it is possible for the court to
tie down the standard and the evidence to the specific circumstances of
the case, while in the former, the standard must be very general and un-
related to any specific obligation.
EVIDENCE
The facts commonly adduced on the issue of mental incompetence
fall roughly into five classes: evidenc6 relating to physical disabilities
and physical symptoms of mental illness, evidence describing social be-
havior, evidence from which inferences of the person's general business
acumen may be drawn, evidence which tends to prove or disprove the
reasonableness of the contract provisions under the circumstances, and
evidence which directly tends to prove the person's capacities and knowl-
edge during negotiation and execution or delivery of the purported con-
tract, will, or gift. In guardianship cases, the appellate courts have not
generally recited specific facts as decisive. They usually state that there
is or is not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict upon the whole
record. It would seem that any evidence from which inferences as to the
alleged incompetent's mentality at the time of the proceeding can be
drawn is cognizable under the standard. Under the will and contract
standards (including the gift cases), however, the appellate courts do re-
cite and emphasize specific evidentiary facts which are divisible into the
above five classes.
When seeking a finding of mental incompetence, counsel have al-
ways tended to rely heavily upon physical disabilities and symptoms of
mental illness, such as old age,4" impairment of senses,47 serious illnesses,"
45. But see Perry v. Perry, 108 Ind. App. 93, 27 N.E.2d 133 (1940), where a
verdict of incompetence to manage one's own estate or business affairs under IND. ANN.
STAT. § 8-301 (Burns 1933) was sustained on the evidence that the alleged incompetent
kept all his income, substantially more than his expenses, in his pockets; that he had
borrowed money but did not know how much, or how much he had repaid; and that
he had collected part of a note due him but did not know how much he had collected.
See also Kutzner v. Meyers, 182 Ind. 669, 108 N.E. 115 (1915), where evidence that the
alleged incompetent had conveyed valuable real estate for an agreement by another to
keep and look after him was admissible on the question of whether a guardian should be
appointed.
46. Keplinger v. Ward, 116 Ind. App. 517, 65 N.E.2d 644 (1946) ; Potter v. Emery,
107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940).
47. Brannon v. Hayes, 190 Ind. 420, 130 N.E. 803 (1920).
48. Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913).
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dizziness,"0 vacant staring,"° and hallucinations, " doubtless because of the
sympathy aroused by this type of evidence. Although under both the
will standard and the recently-emerged, subjective contract standard it
would seem that many of these physical disabilities and symptoms should
become immaterial, if not irrelevant, the courts have not taken this posi-
tion and are inclined to cite such facts as material evidence in both situa-
tions. 2 It is clear, however, that a finding of mental incompetence in a
trial court based wholly or substantially upon this class of evidence will
not be affirmed on appeal."
Evidence of normal or abnormal social behavior has always been
more voluminous than any other type, especially in the will cases. "' Juries
tend to be persuaded by such facts as indecent exposure, "5 attempted sui-
cide,"6 mental depression," uncleanliness, " and unfriendliness.59 The
appellate courts of Indiana have also been inclined to give weight to this
class of evidence, but the extent is uncertain. When the contract standard
was in its earliest stage, evidence relating to social behavior of the indi-
vidual seems to have been decisive.6" The development of the standard
noted above, however, would seem to dictate a substantial decline in the
49. Brannon v. Hayes, 190 Ind. 420, 130 N.E. 803 (1920).
50. Haas v. Haas, 121 Ind. App. 335, 96 N.E.2d 116 (1951).
51. Ibid.
52. See, e.g., Brannon v. Hayes, 190 Ind. 420, 130 N.E. 803 (1921) (dizzy spells,
saw colors) ; Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917) (physically unable
to work, recent serious illness, insomnia, nervous); Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101
N.E. 716 (1913) (impairment of speech, intense pain, hallucinations) ; Potter v. Emery,
107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940) (old age, 3 serious illnesses, staring look in
eyes).
53. In Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944), a trial
court finding of mental incompetence to contract based principally upon old age, illness,
loss of eye sight, and inability to get about was reversed for insufficiency of evidence.
See also Rarick v. Ulmer, 144 Ind. 25, 42 N.E. 1099 (1896) ; Potter v. Emery, 107 Ind.
App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940).
54. See, e.g., Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917) ; Stevens v.
Leonard, 154 Ind. 67, 56 N.E. 27 (1899) ; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (1871) ; Haas v.
Haas, 121 Ind. App. 335, 96 N.E.2d 116 (1951) ; Potter v. Emery, supra note 53.
55. Haas v. Haas, supra note 54.
56. Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (1871).
57. Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917).
58. Potter v. Emery, 107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940).
59. Ibid. But see Stevens v. Leonard, 154 Ind. 67, 56 N.E. 27 (1899).
60. In an early leading case, Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231 (1865), a jury found
mental incompetence on the basis of lay testimony that the party was "weak minded"
and medical testimony that she was incapable of understanding the future effects upon
her legal rights of any transaction without instruction. The Indiana Supreme Court
reversed for insufficiency of evidence noting that the party could read and write, was a
church member in good standing, a faithful wife and step-mother, and discharged her
household duties with ordinary care and judgment. The decision seems correct from
the standpoint of the standard applied--capacity to act with discretion in the ordinary
affairs of life-but one may wonder what light the ordinary affairs of this person's
life threw upon her capacity to execute the contract in question.
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probative value of such facts. At least, evidence of this class alone will
probably no longer support a jury finding of mental incompetence to con-
tract.6 ' The conclusion as to wills is similar-evidence of this class alone
would not likely be sufficient to sustain a verdict of mental incompe-
tence.62 Evidence of social behavior frequently may qualify as evidence
of business acumen, or as directly bearing upon the actor's capacities and
knowledge at the time of negotiation and execution or delivery of the
contract, will, or gift. In these situations, evidence relating to social
behavior should be of much greater significance.63
Evidentiary facts tending to prove the alleged incompetent's general
business acumen have always, and properly, been of a high order of im-
portance under both the contract and will standards. At the early stage
of the contract standard when it concentrated upon capacity to act in ordi-
nary affairs, business acumen was pertinent in so far as business matters
were ordinary affairs of life. Under the present status of the contract
standard, capacity to act with discretion in regard to the business transac-
tion in question can be properly inferred from evidence of a person's
understanding and discretion in past business affairs. In fact, substan-
tial proof of failure to act-with discretion in past business affairs per-
haps should raise a presumption that the person lacked the capacity to act
with discretion in regard to the transaction in question.64 Making a will
involves the same knowledge and foreseeability in many respects as a
business transaction, even though the question of legal capacity must be
cast in different terms. Thus, if evidence of a person's ability to exer-
cise discretion in regard to one business transaction or contract is proba-
tive upon the issue of his ability to act with discretion in regard to an-
other business transaction or contract, it should also be probative of his
ability to act with discretion in regard to a will.
There is a noticeable absence of business acumen evidence in both
will and contract cases, although an examination of the few cases in
which such evidence was relied upon indicates its considerable value." In
61. Keplinger v. Ward, 116 Ind. App. 517, 65 N.E.2d 644 (1946). See also Buuck
v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950) (trial court finding of
competence appealed on basis of social behavior).
62. See Potter v. Emery, 107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940), where a verdict
of mental incompetence based on the facts that the testator was unfriendly, high tempered,
anti-social, oppressive to his wife and daughters and that he ignored his children and
grandchildren and slept in his clothing on the floor was set aside in the face of evidence
that the testator conducted his business satisfactorily.
63. See Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917).
64. The presumption that prior relief from a legal obligation for mental in-
competence creates a presumption in favor of incompetence in subsequent transactions is
based on this type of reasoning. See cases cited note 8 supra.
65. Potter v. Emery, 107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940).
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one instance, the principal facts relied upon by the appellate court in sus-
taining a verdict of mental incompetence to contract were that the paity
believed she was without financial resources during a period when she
had a large bank account, talked of selling her furniture and securities to
obtain cash, and sent some ancient, worthless account books to an ac-
countant for examination.6 Recently, a trial court finding of mental in-
competence was reversed partly because the party had taken care of his
banking satisfactorily, participated in agricultural programs, and con-
ducted a profitable business in rental properties. 7
Facts or observations indicating the reasonableness of an agree-
ment, testamentary disposition, or gift are found in many cases where
the contract standard is adopted and in nearly every case where the will
standard is used, along with comments by the court that the jury may
consider such facts in determining the issue of mental competence.6"
Doubtless this factor has some effect upon both juries and courts. In
cases where the contract standard is applied, the appellate courts give con-
siderable weight to this class of evidence when ruling upon the sufficiency
of evidence to sustain a verdict. In one instance where the court adopted
the contract standard to determine the validity of a deed which deprived
the grantor's son of a right of survivorship in a half interest in business
property, evidence that the grantor was alienated from her son because
he had attempted to have her committed to a mental institution went far
to establish her competence to execute the deed." In a similar case, the
alleged incompetent entered a contract for support whereby he conveyed
his farm to one son and cut off his other heirs presumptive. The court
reversed a trial court finding of mental incompetence partly on the basis
of evidence that the grantor was embittered toward the plaintiffs for
having instituted a guardianship action against him.7" On the other
hand, where the will standard is applied, it is difficult to find a case in
which an appellate court has relied upon evidence meant to establish the
reasonableness of the disposition of property. In one case the supreme
court appeared impressed by the fact that the will in question, which
made no reference to the testator's three daughters, was not unreasonable
under the circumstances, but refused to reverse the jury's finding of
mental incompetence even though there was other substantial evidence of
66. Brannon v. Hayes, 190 Ind. 420, 130 N.E. 803 (1921).
67. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944).
68. See, e.g., Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913); Swygart v.
Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 76 N.E. 755 (1906) ; Rarick v. Ulmer, 144 Ind. 25, 42 N.E. 1099
(1896); Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 266, 23 N.E. 771 (1889) ; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind.
69 (1871); Potter v. Emery, 107 Ind. App. 628, 26 N.E.2d 554 (1940).
69. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599-(1944).
70. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950).
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competence and very little evidence of incompetence. 7' The same court has
said that a finding of incompetence based solely on an unnatural disposi-
tion of property must be reversed for lack of evidence."
Evidence bearing directly upon the alleged incompetent's capacities
and knowledge during negotiation and execution or delivery of the pur-
ported contract, will, or gift includes a wide variety of facts which are
often peculiar to individual cases. Examples which one might expect to
encounter with some frequency are: testimony from witnesses who were
present during periods of negotiation and at execution or delivery as to
the party's demeanor"3 and the influence, if any, exerted by other persons
upon his judgment;4 evidence as to whether he received independent ad-
vice in the matter or had the agreement or other instrument drawn by his
own counsel;75 evidence as to whether the alleged incompetent solicited
the agreement (if a contract case) himself ;76 and testimony as to his de-
clared intentions and reasons for entering the contract or making the will
or gift, both prior and subsequent to execution, and whether his act tended
to effectuate them." This class of evidence should be important at any
stage of development of the contract standard. It would seem to have
much bearing upon the individual's capacity to act with discretion in the
ordinary affairs of life at the time of the purported legal act. Under the
present subjective stage, these facts would seem to be the essence of
proof or disproof of mental competence. The will standard has always
been oriented toward the testator's capacities and knowledge at the time
of execution, so that one might expect to find even greater reliance upon
this class of evidence in the will cases than in the contract cases.
There has, however, been conspicuously little reliance upon this kind
of evidence in appellate courts under either standard in Indiana. In the
contract area such evidence is found only in two recent cases. In one,
the plaintiff sought to avoid a contract in settlement of litigation on the
ground that he was mentally incompetent at the time it was executed.
The Indiana Appellate Court affirmed the trial court finding of com-
petence, citing evidence that the plaintiff had admitted he understood the
terms of the contract, that he had personally taken part in the "horse-
trading and dickering" involved in negotiation of the contract, and that
71. Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913).
72. Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 266, 23 N.E. 771 (1889).
73. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944).
74. Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236, 150 N.E. 361 (1926).
75. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944).
76. Ibid.
77. Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913) ; Conway v. Vizzard, 122
Ind. 266, 23 N.E. 771 (1889) ; Daugherty v. Daugherty, supra note 76.
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he had ably protected his position so that he would not be put in a
"squeeze financially."" s In the other, the alleged incompetent deeded his
farm to one of his sons in return for support and maintenance. The
other heirs sought to avoid the contract and cancel the deed. In revers-
ing a trial court finding of mental incompetence, the court attached con-
siderable importance to the facts that the alleged incompetent had his
lawyer draw the contract in question, that it was drawn so as to protect
the client's rights fully, and that he had originally sought the agreement
because he feared loss of his property unless other arrangements were
made for its maintenance. Countervailing evidence showed that the
negotiations had taken place in secret so the favored son was in a position
to exert influence."0 Under the will standard cases, evidence of this class
appears somewhat more frequently. When present it assumes promi-
nence. In one case, the most significant facts sustaining the verdict of
mental incompetence were that the testator took three hours to prepare
his brief will, that it was contradictory in terms, and that he frequently
spoke erroneously of its terms thereafter." Evidence that a will is in
substantial accord with declarations concerning its provisions made by the
testator at times prior or subsequent to the execution has often been given
considerable probative value.8"
PARTIAL INSANITY
In both contract and will cases, the courts have made extensive use
of the concept of partial insanity, monomania, or the insane delusion. 2
This is a supplemental standard to be applied as an instruction upon re-
quest when the evidence suggests that the party was without the ability
to act with discretion upon the occasion in question solely because of the
peculiarities of the situation, rather than because of a-general inability to
act with reason at the particular time. 3 The standard is usually stated
in the will cases as requiring a spontaneous conception and acceptance as
fact of that which has no existence except in the imagination, a persistent
belief in the supposed fact against all evidence and probability, and some
78. Mahin v. Soshnick, 148 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. App. 1958).
79. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944).
80. Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917); Pence v. Meyers,
180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913).
81. See cases cited note 77 supra.
82. The terms are used interchangeably in the decisions. See Allman v. Malsbury,
224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106 (1946) ; Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458 (1881).
83. There is no discernible tendency on the part of the Indiana courts to require
an instruction on partial insanity in the absence of specific evidence going to that
question. But see language to the contrary in Schuff v. Ransom, supra note 82, decided
under an earlier statute which included monomania in the definition of a person of
unsound mind. Ind. Acts 1876, ch. 5, § 1.
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relationship between the belief and the will."4 The statement in the con-
tract cases is similar, except that there is no requirement of spontaneity.85
A few statements of the partial insanity test in will cases do not include
the element of spontaneity, but these do not seem to be authoritative."
There appears to be no reason why a false belief must have arisen
spontaneously, i.e., without inducement from sources outside the testa-
tor's own mind, in order to qualify as an insane delusion. The crucial
factors appear to be the existence'of the belief in the mind of the testator,
its persistent character, its absolute falsity, and its relation to the purported
legal act. Further, it is unlikely that such beliefs ever, in fact, arise com-
pletely divorced from outside sources; in most cases proof of the spon-
taneity element probably amounts to no more than failure to prove the
source of the belief. The mischief of such a requirement is suggested
by two Indiana cases. In one, a testator who firmly believed that his
wife and daughter were witches was held not to be suffering from an
insane delusion -since the belief seemed to have had' its origin in harsh
treatment which he had received at their hands." In the other, a false
belief that the testatrix's daughters were trying to poison her was held not
to be an insane delusion since the testatrix's son had planted the thought
in her mind.8" It is, of course, possible that the beliefs held by the testa-
tors in these cases could not in any event have been characterized as in-
sane delusions, but it is doubtful that the fact of disclosure of sources
should have been determinative of the question. Nevertheless, with re-
gard to wills the spontaneity element seems to be firmly established in the
case law. 8
As to the second requirement, that of persistent belief against all
evidence and probability, it is clear that in order to prove that a delusion
84. E.g., Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107 N.E. 675 (1915); Friedersdorf v.
Lacy, 173 Ind. 429, 90 N.E. 766 (1910). In Johnson v. Johnson, 10 Ind. 387 (1858), the
plaintiff sought to avoid a contract to sell land on the ground of partial insanity.
Evidence was introduced which proved that he believed his wife to be "bewitched."
The court held that this fact alone was insufficient basis for a finding of mental in-
competence to contract.
85. Nichol v. -Thomas, 33 Ind. 42, 47 (1876). An earlier statement of the test
required that the belief be an "extravagant" one. Wray v. Wray, 32 Ind. 126, 131 (1869).
86. See Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107 N.E. (1915), where the court approves
a definition which does not include the element of spontaneity citing McReynolds v.
Smith, 172 Ind. 336, 86 N.E. 1009 (1909), and Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502 (1874).
Such a definition is found in the cited cases, but in the form of a repeated trial court
instruction. In neither case was an objection directed to, nor did the court comment
upon, this aspect of the instruction. An instruction to this effect was indorsed in Rush
v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69 (1871).
87. Addington v. Wilson, 5 Ind. 137 (1854).
88. Friedersdorf v. Lacy, 173 Ind. 429, 90 N.E. 766 (1910).
,89. Allman v. Malsbury, 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106 (1946); Robbins v. Fugit,
189 Ind. 165, 126 N.E. 321 (1920).
NOTES
was an insane one, the party seeking to establish the particular delusion
must prove that substantial evidence was presented to the alleged incom-
petent, or argument or persuasion used to convince him of the falsity of
the belief." An instruction permitting the jury to consider as a circum-
stance tending to show an insane delusion the fact that the testator falsely
believed the plaintiff had assaulted him or otherwise mistreated him was
held erroneous because it should have embodied the idea that the testator
held this belief in the face of facts to the contrary and in the face of
reason.9'
The final requirement, that the belief have some bearing upon the in-
strument (contract or will), is not well defined. In the will cases it has
been said alternatively that the partial insanity must have affected the
disposition of property,92 controlled or affected the execution of the
will,93 or prompted the action and affected the object and purpose in mak-
ing a will. 4 The contract cases have held at various times that the contract
must be the "offspring of the partial insanity,"9 that the false belief must
impair one's capacity to acquire and dispose of property," or that the
false belief must control or influence the execution of the contract. 7
Strict use of language dictates that the required relationship, however
expressed, should not be between the false belief and the execution of the
instrument, whether will or contract, but rather between the false belief
and the disposition of property in the one case and the particular contrac-
tual obligations in the other.
CONCLUSIONS
The striking common feature of the standards of mental competence
in contract, will, gift, and guardianship cases is the lack of careful defi-
nition either by statute or through case development. In none of the
areas do the courts seem to be interested in keeping the standard tech-
nically clear and delineated. The reason seems to lie in a lack of faith
in the standards which they themselves have drawn, in a misconception
90. Robbins v. Fugit, supra note 89. See also Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107
N.E. 675 (1915), which recognizes that there may be a belief the falsity of which
cannot be proved.
91. Robbins v. Fugit, supra note 89.
92. Gallmeier v. Kaiser, 83 Ind. App. 161, 163 N.E. 533 (1928).
93. Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1917); Wiley v. Gordon,
181 Ind. 252, 104 N.E. 500 (1913) ; Harbison v. Boyd, 177 Ind. 267, 96 N.E. 587 (1912) ;
McReynolds v. Smith, 172 Ind. 336, 86 N.E. 1009 (1909) ; Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind.
25, 76 N.E. 755 (1906) ; Wait v. Westfall, 161 Ind. 648, 68 N.E. 274 (1903).
94. Swygart v. Willard, supra note 93 at 37, 76 N.E. at 760.
95. Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42, 47 (1876).
96. Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30 (1862).
97. Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 1047 (1895).
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of the functions of legal standards, or perhaps in both. Standards
should guide lawyers in gathering and presenting evidence which is rele-
vant to the inquiry. The weight of evidence indicated by the standard,
and none other, should determine the issue. In the Indiana cases, how-
ever, one finds the courts discussing the standard merely as it was given
in an instruction. The applicable standard is treated as a formality
rather than a tool, with few cases actually attempting to relate the evi-
dence to it.
Nor do the elements of the standard adopted seem to be particularly
determinative of many cases. It has been noted that in cases of contracts,
wills, and gifts great emphasis has been put upon the objective question
of whether the act of the alleged incompetent was reasonable under the
circumstances, while the standards adopted were almost wholly subjec-
tive.9" Further, lay opinions when based at least partly on conduct de-
scribed in testimony apparently have carried more weight with the courts
than those of experts,99 although experts would seem more qualified by
their experience and scientific approach to observation to answer ques-
tions which require "looking into the mind" of the individual. This may
indicate that the courts are more interested in what the ordinary man
thinks of the nature of the motivation behind the act than in attempting
to answer the much more difficult questions presented by a subjective
standard.
One may also question the wide acceptance of evidence of physical
disabilities and symptoms of mental illness as probative under the articu-
late standards. Except where guardianship of the person is the issue,
physical disabilities as such seem immaterial. The probative value of
physical symptoms as manifestations of mental illness should be de-
emphasized unless such evidence is accompanied by competent expert
testimony as to what type or types of mental illness are suggested by the
evidence and what effect such illness would be likely to have upon the
capacities required under the particular standard. Jurors should not be
98. This phenomenon is not explainable on the theory that the state of a person's
mind may be determined from his observable conduct, since the conduct being observed is
precisely that which is to be judged from a subjective approach. When the judge or
jury is permitted to determine whether an act was done by an incompetent person on
the basis of whether a reasonable man might have done likewise under the known
circumstances, the standard is objective. This position is supported by the observation
that in a number of cases evidence of many unreasonable acts by the alleged incompetent
prior and subsequent to the act sought to be nullified has not been controlling where
the latter act might be considered reasonable under the known circumstances. E.g., Pence
v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913) ; Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262,
95 N.E.2d 304 (1950).
99. See Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231 (1865); Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121
Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950).
NOTES
expected to draw correct inferences from evidence of physical symptoms
of mental illness to the person's ability to satisfy a subjective legal stand-
ard of mental competence, or even the objective business affairs standard
frequently applied in the guardianship of estate cases.
These inconsistencies between standards and evidence do not neces-
sarily mean that the subjective approach is misleading or unworkable
and should be abandoned in favor of an objective standard.' On the
contrary, unless the proceeding is one for guardianship, it is not necessary
or proper for the court to make broad findings as to a person's compe-
tence where the only question pertinent to the litigation is whether the
person was capable of sufficiently understanding the legal act in which
he purported to engage. The standard should measure the depth, or
quantity, or quality of understanding which as a matter of public policy
should be required to give legal effect to the act. This varies with the
complexity of the act and can only be reached by specific findings relat-
ing directly to the person's capabilities at the time of the act. Thus, the
subjective standards present a more satisfactory approach to the issues
involved.
In order for these standards to achieve their proper significance,
however, certain weaknesses in their usual constructions should be elimi-
nated. First, when the capacity to act with discretion in the ordinary
affairs of life is an element, whether it be for contracts, wills, or gifts,
the standard is misleading. The ordinary affairs of one person's life
do not necessarily correspond to the ordinary affairs of another's life.
Further, the capacity to act in the ordinary affairs of an ordinary per-
son's life is so broad a standard that it has little bearing upon the question
of the capacity of a particular perosn to understand a particular trans-
action. It has been noted that this element is tending to disappear in
both the contract and will standards.
Another problem which should be resolved before the standards of
mental competence for contracts, wills, and gifts can become fully work-
able relates to partial insanity. Although partial insanity as a supple-
mental test of mental competence is a firmly established concept, its util-
ity is questionable at least under the present standards. In the contract
cases when the principal standard has as one of its elements the ability
to act with discretion in relation to the matters contained in the contract,
the partial insanity situation would seem to be within its scope. Likewise,
when the will standard is stated to include the ability to form a rational
100. Professor Green advocates abandonment of the subjective standards in favor
of objective ones in Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise,
53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
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judgment in relation to matters contained in the will,'' the test seems to
be superfluous rather than supplemental. Furthermore, the tendency to
set partial insanity aside as a special problem of mental incompetence has
resulted in confusion as to when the test is applicable and in undue and
technical refinements upon its use.'
A third problem involves the quest for a standard which is applicable
in the gift situation. It is difficult to criticize the theory of the Indiana
courts that no greater mental capacity should be required of an indi-
vidual to execute an inter vivos gift than is required to make a testa-
mentary disposition. Yet if one accepts the idea that a standard of men-
tal competence should measure subjectively the alleged incompetent's ca-
pacity to comprehend the transaction in question, it follows that some
of the elements of the standard for making a will are not appropriate in
the gift situation. To put it more broadly, one may say that generally
the same mental capacity should be required to execute a will or a gift, or
even a contract, but when it comes to a determination of fact whether
such capacity existed in a particular case, the standard in order to be fully
workable should be phrased in terms of the factors which are relevant to
that particular inquiry. Thus, the elements of a standard for mental
capacity to execute a gift inter vivos might approach a contract standard
more nearly than a will standard and would include recognition and com-
prehension of the donee, the property affected, the probable consequences
of the act, and the ability to act with discretion in relation to the matter.
Finally, the question of mental incompetence in guardianship pro-
ceedings needs to be re-examined. It is of a different nature than the
same question in a contract, will, or gift situation. There is no particular
act in regard to which the alleged incompetent's capacity can be deter-
mined. The subjective approach used in contract, will, and gift cases is
therefore impossible. The issue in these cases seems to be whether the
person has some level of capacity which the law considers a pre-requisite
to carrying on certain ordinary affairs in the life of an ordinary man.
Since in Indiana, guardianship may be instituted for the protection of the
person, the estate, or both,' the standard to be employed should embrace
only those ordinary affairs which are within the purpose of the proceed-
ing. Thus, if the proceeding is based upon an allegation that the alleged
incompetent is unable to take care of his personal needs or social re-
sponsibilities, as may be .the case with one who is physically handicapped
101. Not all statements of the will standard include this particular element, but it
certainly is not error to do so. See cases cited notes 16 and 17 mtpra.
102. E.g., requirement of spontaneity, requirement of proof that attempts were made
to dissuade the alleged incompetent. See cases cited notes 86 and 90 supra.
103. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-106 (Bums 1953).
510
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or emotionally unbalanced, the standard should be based on the capacity
necessary to satisfy the personal needs or social responsibilities of an ordi-
nary person. A substantial showing under such a standard would justify
appointment of a guardian of the person, but not of the estate. The
standard in the latter situation should go to the ability to act with discre-
tion in the ordinary business affairs of an ordinary person. Finally,
appointment of a guardian of both person and estate should require a
substantial showing under both standards.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN IN INDIANA:
CAPACITY AND STANDARD OF CARE
There appear to be two major views in the United States today con-
cerning the issue of contributory negligence of children.' These are
usually denominated as the Illinois rule and the Massachusetts rule.2 It
is not the purpose of this note to make an exhaustive study of cases in the
various states or even to determine which is the majority rule. The pur-
pose is to examine the cases in Indiana and determine which, if either, of
the rules the Indiana courts follow. In discussing the doctrine of
contributory negligence of childrefn, if is im5ortait at-the 6-fhtset to dis-
tinguish between the terms capacity and standard of care. Generally
when a court is speaking of a child's capacity, it is referring to his ability
to realize and appreciate a given danger or risk; but when it speaks of a
standard of care it means the standard to which the child will be held
after it is determined that he has the required capacity.
The Massachusetts rule, as generally stated, is that a child, regard-
less of age, is held to the same standard of care which is ordinarily ex-
ercised under similar circumstances by children of the same age, intelli-
gence, and experience.3  Whether or not this standard has been met is a
question of fact and must be determined by the jury.' Many states fol-
low the same rule but alter the language slightly, substituting capacity,5
1. Cf. Wilderman, Presumptions Existing in Favor of the Infant in Re: The
Question of an Infant's Ability to be Guilty of Contributory Negligence, 10 IND. L.J.
427 (1935).
2. See 5 FoRannt L. REv. 367 (1936).
3. E.g., Giacobbe v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 224, 102 N.E. 322 (1913).
4. Ibid.
5. Braswell v. Smith, 27 Ga. 623, 110 S.E. 415 (1921).
